A recent Atlantic article by David Brooks (2024), in its criticism of the new meritocracy, claimed: “In some ways, we’ve just re-established the old hierarchy rooted in wealth and social status—only the new elites possess greater hubris, because they believe that their status has been won by hard work and talent rather than by birth. The sense that they “deserve” their success for having earned it can make them feel more entitled to the fruits of it, and less called to the spirit of noblesse oblige.” Though interesting, I won’t discuss the idea of the new hierarchy this time, but rather the idea of noblesse oblige. It is especially interesting to me that the crisis of whether or not the wealthy and powerful ought to have noblesse oblige is not a new one. 

In the waning years of the Republic, Rome saw a political split between the optimates and populares. Essentially, the optimates were the entrenched, traditionalist, wealthy politicians who dominated the Senate and the populares were populists seeking to equalize society and provide more opportunities for the common man. One of the biggest sources of conflict between the two factions was over the grain dole and land redistribution. The grain dole was a handout program that sold subsidized grain and subsequently began to provide free grain to a few hundred thousand of the urban poor in Rome. It was an attempt to combat poverty and the often wily grain traders. The land redistribution efforts were a result of a phenomenon where many middle-class farmers who went to serve in the military were forced to leave their farms desolate. The desolate farms would often then be sold to the ultra-wealthy latifundia plantations. This situation resulted in the destruction of much of the middle class and forced them to join the urban poor.

This part of the conflict, in particular, could not have been characterized better by the decision to have or not to have noblesse oblige. Both the Optimates and Populares were from the elite—the founders of the grain dole program and avid supporters of land redistribution, the Gracchi brothers, were themselves from the affluent Scipio family. The Gracchi and the other populares were for noblesse oblige and supporting the less well-off, whereas the Optimates were obviously against it.

 This conflict about what society should value is not dissimilar to what the article claims we are experiencing now. A split between the wealthy and the poor along with an increasingly noblesse oblige-averse upper class. If anything, this is a phenomenon that should cause some worry. More or less, it was this conflict that ultimately led to the various civil wars and power struggles that eventually destroyed the Republic. Though I believe that the American situation is not nearly as dire as what afflicted Rome, one can still argue that this is the writing on the wall. I believe, however, that the solution isn’t to force the upper classes to provide handouts, but to instead begin a cultural shift—what the article writer would see as a reversal. Noblesse obliges will come as needed if the elites recognize those who may not have been as well off as equal and worthy.

_{Brooks,  D. (2024, November 14). How the Ivy League Broke America: The meritocracy isn’t working. We need something new. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2024/12/meritocracy-college-admissions-social-economic-segregation/680392/}

Cover Photo by Jaylan.